












DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC 




































N° 203                                   May 2004 
Fiscal effects of accession 




Directorate-General for  




Economic Papers are written by the Staff of the Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, or by experts working in association with 
them. The "Papers" are intended to increase awareness of the technical work 
being done by the staff and to seek comments and suggestions for further 
analyses. Views expressed represent exclusively the positions of the author 
and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission. 
Comments and enquiries should be addressed to the: 
 
European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Publications 
BU1 - -1/180 






























©European Communities, 2004 
 
 Fiscal effects of accession in the new Member States 
 




The paper looks at the evidence on the widespread hypothesis in the academic 
literature and by some of the new Member States’ governments that accession 
will bring about fiscal strains and requires higher budget deficits. It starts by 
calculating the expected new Member States’ payments from the EU budget and 
looks at the issues of additionality and national co-financing of EU funds. Other 
possible fiscal effects from accession are briefly discussed. Based on the results, 
the paper concludes that - on balance and in contrast to what the literature often 
maintains - accession should rather reduce the fiscal strains in the new Member 
States. Changes in the new Member States’ budgets will certainly be necessary 
and the transition year 2004 could be particularly difficult in that budgetary and 
administrative procedures have to be adapted in order to actually absorb the 
payments as projected by the Copenhagen package. However, this should not be 
a fundamental problem unless there are built-in inflexibilities in the budget, 
arising from a weak political system, different fiscal layers or a strong fiscal 





Since their accession to the EU in May 2004, the 10 new Member States have to 
apply all existing EU rules, including the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
obligation to work towards nominal convergence in order to eventually adopt 
the euro. Since the most well-known of these rules is to respect a 3%-ceiling on 
the budget deficit, the new Member States’ budgetary position is increasingly 
attracting attention since many of them are still close to or above that ceiling 
and some of the new Member States expect higher deficits in 2004 (see Table 
1). A frequently voiced argument is that accession itself triggers substantial 
additional public expenditure in the new Member States and therefore brings 
about higher budget deficits. The required national co-financing of EU 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund projects is claimed to pose a particular 
difficulty. While the focus of this paper is on the first part of the argument, i.e. 
whether accession brings about substantially higher public expenditure, it 
should be borne in mind that, even if it were so, higher deficits are only one way 
of financing higher expenditure, the alternatives being higher taxation or 
expenditure cuts elsewhere. Furthermore, it must be remembered that not every 
transfer from the EU budget to a Member State is recorded in the general 
government account since some funding goes directly to private beneficiaries 
where the government functions only as a “postman”. Hence, this paper will not 
take an accounting approach which would allow deriving an equivalent change 
in the general government position of a new Member State, but rather an 
  3economic approach in the sense of the net position of a new Member State vis-
à-vis the EU. However, the two approaches are not completely unrelated 
because even a direct transfer from the EU budget to a private beneficiary could 
substitute previous funding from the general government budget. 
Table 1: General government net borrowing (-) and net lending (+) in the new 
Member States in % of GDP, 2000-2006 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Czech Republic -4.5 -6.4 -6.4 -12.9 -5.9 -5.1 -4.0
Estonia -0.3 0.3 1.8 2.6 0.7 0.0 0.0
Cyprus -2.4 -2.4 -4.6 -6.3 -4.6 -4.1 -2.2
Latvia -2.7 -1.6 -2.7 -1.8 -2.2 -2.0 -2.0
Lithuania -2.6 -2.1 -1.4 -1.7 -2.8 -2.6 -1.8
Hungary -3.0 -4.4 -9.3 -5.9 -4.9 -4.3 -2.5
Malta -6.5 -6.4 -5.7 -9.7 -5.9 -4.5 -3.4
Poland -1.8 -3.5 -3.6 -4.1 -6.0 -4.5 -3.4
Slovenia -3.0 -2.7 -1.9 -1.8 -1.7 -1.7 -1.3
Slovak Republic -12.3 -6.0 -5.7 -3.6 -4.1 -3.9 -2.9  
Source: Eurostat (based on fiscal notifications) for 2000-2003, Commission forecasts for 2004 
and 2005, and Pre-accession Economic Programmes for 2006. Figures are provisional for 2003 
and “constant policy” forecasts for 2004 and 2005; methodology in principle according to ESA 
95 national accounts. 
 
The literature is far from conclusive on the issue. While it is often stated that 
accession will imply further budgetary challenges in addition to those already 
arising from economic transition,
1 there are very few quantitative indications. 
One exception is Kopits/Székely (2002) who, after estimating the size of a long 
list of potential direct and indirect fiscal effects, arrive at an estimate of a 
negative net budgetary effect “conservatively estimated in the range of 3 to 
4¾% of GDP” for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. 
They maintain that these effects could at best be compensated by positive 
longer-term indirect effects which are difficult to quantify. Based on almost the 
same list of items, Backé (2002) makes a similar – albeit more cautious - 
estimate (see Table 2) and concludes that “in the short run, membership in the 
European Union will add to the fiscal strains on accession countries. In the 
medium run, overall effects can be expected to be broadly neutral or slightly 
positive, while some uncertainty prevails on the magnitude of several individual 
effects, in particular on future public investment needs.” On the basis of the 
same methodology, and emphasizing the importance of the absorption capacity, 
Antczak (2003) foresees “fiscal deficits deteriorating by up to 3 percent of GDP 
in the first few years after accession”. 
 
                                                 
1 See for example European Commission 2002a, pp. 131ff., or Feldman/Watson 2002, pp.141ff. 
  4Table 2: Backé’s estimate of fiscal effects of EU membership – annual effects on 
the fiscal balance over the medium term following EU accession 
  % of GDP 
Direct effects   
Contribution to EU budget  -1.0 to –1.2 
EU structural operations  -0.9 to 1.3 
Infrastructural expenditure  ? 
Public administration reform and acquis implementation  +/-0? 
Realignment of customs duties  +0.2 to –0.5 
Tax harmonisation  +0.5 
Phase-out of production subsidies  +0.2 to +2 
Indirect effects   
Positive growth effects  +(+/-0 to +1?) 
Structural reforms  +(minor?) 
Tax competition  -(minor?) 
Reduced risk premia  +(anticipated?) 
Source: Backé 2002, p. 163 
Most of the new Member States’ 2003 Pre-accession Economic Programmes 
(PEPs) provide some calculations of the effects of accession from a budget 
accounting point of view with very different approaches and results. The Czech 
PEP concludes that “in the short-term outlook EU accession will lead to an 
immediate increase of the government sector deficit by 0.3 – 1 per cent of 
GDP”. The conclusion in the Hungarian PEP is that “as the direct financial 
result of accession, the balance of the central government is expected to 
deteriorate in 2004, while some of the indirect additional revenues arising from 
the various multiplicator effects will offset the negative effects in later years.” 
The Polish authorities forecast that the EU budget will be a net payer to 
Poland’s budget, although “a substantial share will be contributed to the private 
sector without intermediation of the state budget”. The Slovakian PEP 
differentiates between the positive net position vis-à-vis the EU budget, which 
is +1.3% of GDP in all years, and the net budgetary impact of accession which 
is projected to be negative at -0.1% of GDP in 2004 and -0.7% of GDP in 2005 
and 2006. This difference arises by considerations of which payments from the 
EU will also occur on the expenditure side of the national budget since they are 
not substituting already existing expenditure, which is seen to be only the case 
for some agricultural expenditure. The Slovenian authorities have calculated a 
positive net balance of +0.38% in 2004, +0.32% in 2005 and +0.31% in 2006. 
A particular difficulty when analysing this issue lies in determining the 
counterfactual situation which implicitly assumes that non-membership is the 
alternative. Most economists would agree that this would have much wider 
economic implications with subsequent fiscal effects, not least in terms of 
adaptations of investors’ expectations. However, the general economic impact 
of accession in the new Member States and the possible resulting indirect fiscal 
effects shall be ignored here in order to focus exclusively on direct budgetary 
aspects.
2 Neither will the expected economic impact of EU funding be taken 
                                                 
2 Hence, in the terminology of Kopits and Székely 2002, we will only deal with “direct effects” 
here and neglect any “indirect effects”.  
  5into account. Thus we are only looking at fiscal effects in the strictest sense, not 
at the wider economic and fiscal impact of accession. This should not imply a 
fundamental methodological problem since accession did not come as a “big 
bang” from an economic point of view but is a rather smooth and long-term 
process which started in the first half of the 1990s. It comes on top of an already 
high degree of economic integration between old and new Member States which 
was brought about by the Europe Agreements and the implementation of 
commitments undertaken in the accession negotiations.  
The paper starts by calculating the expected payments from the EU budget to 
the new Member States (section 2). Section 3 looks at the issues of additionality 
and national co-financing of EU funds. Section 4 discusses other possible fiscal 
effects from accession and section 5 concludes. In doing so, only publicly 
available information is used in the paper which does not benefit from any 
privileged access to Commission-internal information. The time horizon is that 
of the current financial framework of the EU, i.e. until the end of 2006, since 
anything beyond 2006 would be mere speculation. Sources and methodologies 
applied for the calculations in this paper are explained in further detail in the 
Annex. 
2.  Payments from the EU budget  
The EU budget distinguishes between commitment appropriations and 
payments appropriations. While commitment appropriations make legal 
obligations during the financial year for activities whose implementation may 
extend over several financial years, payment appropriations make it possible to 
cover expenditure arising from commitments entered into legal obligations 
during current and preceding financial years. Although, from a budgetary 
planning perspective, commitments are the most important budget figures, 
actual payments are more relevant from an economic point of view and from the 
beneficiaries’ perspective. For that reason, only payments figures are used here. 
Figure 1 presents estimates on the payments from the EU budget to the new 
Member States relative to GDP from 2004 to 2006 on the basis of what was 
agreed at the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002 and 
eventually inserted into the Accession Treaty (detailed figures are in Table A.1 
in the Annex). In addition, estimates on payments related to EU pre-accession 
instruments (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD) have been included because – in 
contrast to commitments –the new Member States will continue to receive 
payments also after accession which are related to commitments made before 
accession. According to our estimates, pre-accession funds have an average size 
relative to GDP of close to 0.4% in all years.  
  6Figure 1: Total payments from the EU budget to the new Member States in % of 
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Source: own calculations; see Annex for explanations on methodology 
 
Overall, the Baltic countries, Poland and Malta tend to be the largest recipients 
of EU payments relative to GDP (detailed figures can be found in Table A.2 in 
the Annex). In 2005 and 2006, these countries can be expected to receive EU 
payments amounting to 3% and more of their GDP. On average over the period 
2004-2006 and for all new Member States, payments are 62% of commitments, 
with an ascending profile of 44% in 2004 and 68% in the years 2005 and 2006 
respectively. Because of the relative importance of budgetary compensations, 
which are easier to absorb (further explained below), these percentages are 
substantially higher for Cyprus and Malta as well as, to a lesser degree, 
Slovenia. Apart from the technical point of a shorter EU budget year 2004 for 
the new Member States, this profile over time is to some extent driven by 
concerns about the absorption capacity of new Member States with a view to 
their administrative capacity to smoothly and efficiently manage EU funds 
under a new regulatory system, such as for example the fairly complex 
programming and control procedures under the Structural Funds.  
As the own resources system is fully applied to the new Member States from 
May 2004 on, it was decided that, as in previous rounds of enlargement, all new 
Member States will benefit from transitional arrangements on their financial 
obligations towards the EU budget through budgetary compensations.
3 The 
purpose of these compensations is to offset a possible deterioration of the net 
budgetary position of the new Member States in comparison with their situation 
in 2003 as beneficiaries of pre-accession funds for mainly two reasons. First, a 
deterioration could have resulted from the fact that the new Member States will 
have to pay immediately full contributions to the budget, while the level of 
payments for differentiated appropriations will lag the corresponding level of 
                                                 
3 Cf. the original proposal in European Commission 2002b. 
  7commitments. Second, it could have been an outcome of the fact that 
reimbursements from the EU budget for Member States’ expenditure on direct 
payments in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy are only made the 
year after their payment to farmers. Articles 29 and 30 of the Accession Treaty 
define the amounts of the “temporary budgetary compensation” for the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia and the “special lump-sum cash-flow 
facility” for all new Member States. The relative size of these budgetary 
compensations is particularly substantial in the cases of Malta (above 2% of 
GDP in 2005 and 2006) and Cyprus (around 1% in 2005 and 2006), whereas for 
the other eight new Member States they are the highest in 2004 (between 0.2% 
and 0.4%) and are diminishing afterwards. 
Estimates for the new Member States’ contributions to the EU budget are 
available in the EU Budget 2004 (cf. European Commission 2004). As a 
percentage of GDP, the new Member States will contribute in a range between 
0.66% (Czech Republic) and 0.82% (Malta) in 2004. The difference between 
total payments presented in Figure 1 and these estimates of contributions in 
2004 gives the net payments in Figure 2. In order to get an estimate for the years 
2005 and 2006, we increased by half the GDP ratios of contributions estimated 
for 2004 (i.e. 1.1% of GDP on average) because the new Member States only 
participate in – and only contribute for - two thirds of the budget year 2004. On 
average, the new Member States will receive net payments in the order of 
0.87% of GDP in 2004, 1.49% of GDP in 2005 and 1.62% of GDP in 2006. The 
Baltic countries, Poland and Malta will receive higher net payments than others 
in a range of 1.9% to 3.7% of GDP in 2006.  
Figure 2: Estimated net payments from EU budget to the new Member States in 
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Source: own calculations; see Annex for explanations on methodology 
 
  8Because of the importance of the national income as a basis to calculate the 
contributions and to allocate Structural Funds payments, the net position tends 
to be negatively correlated with countries’ income per capita. In this perspective 
it is interesting to compare the new Member States’ future EU budget position 
with the old Member States’ current EU budget position. The European 
Commission (2003c, p.126) provides a calculation of the old Member States’ 
“operational budgetary balance after UK correction” relative to Gross National 
Income (GNI) with 2002 as the latest available year. The Commission’s 
methodological approach is to exclude both traditional own resources and 
administrative expenditure since they can not be directly attributed to a Member 
State. The same methodology has been applied here to the new Member States 
for the year 2006, although necessarily somewhat simpler and based on 
projections, and therefore not fully comparable to the figures for the 15 Member 
States in 2002 (see Annex for more detailed methodological explanations). 
Taking the EU-15 income average and a neutral EU budget position as a 
benchmark, as indicated by the ordinates in Figure 3, it can be seen that all 
countries - except marginally Ireland and Italy - are in the expected quadrants, 
i.e. wealthier countries are net contributors and poorer countries are net 
recipients. As for the net recipients there is a negative slope which means that 
the poorer a country the higher its EU budget balance relative to income. 
Compared to the current Cohesion Countries (Greece, Spain Ireland and 
Portugal), the new Member States seem to have a less favourable position in 
2006 than the Cohesion Countries have currently. However, it has to be 
remembered that there is no full comparability of data and that Ireland is set to 
see a deterioration of its position due to less payments from Structural and 
Cohesion Funds and higher contributions to the EU budget in the coming years. 
Figure 3: Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in PPS in 2001 and 
operational EU budget balance in % of GNI, in 2002 for the 15 old Member 
States and in 2006 for the 10 new Member States  
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Note: Data for the 15 old Member States on the one hand and for the 10 new Member States on 
the other hand are not fully comparable 
Source: European Commission 2003d, p.126, for 15 Member States and own calculations for 
the new Member States (see Annex for explanations on methodology) 
  9 
In view of these considerable net payments from the EU budget, in particular to 
some of the poorer new Member States, it is further explored below whether 
they could be offset by other fiscal effects such as requirements of additionality 
and national co-financing of EU structural assistance (section 3) or other 
indirect fiscal effects arising from accession (section 4). 
3.  Additionality and co-financing of EU funds 
From the new Member States’ budget point of view, a crucial question is how 
much of the payments from the EU budget have to be additional and which may 
substitute already existing expenditure. Furthermore, some EU programmes also 
require a national complementary funding, so-called co-financing. Going 
through the lines of the Copenhagen package, it is obvious that the budgetary 
compensations are specifically designed to improve the new Member States’ 
budget position and do not trigger any national expenditure. Existing internal 
policies and transitional expenditure (heading 3) are not explicitly additional 
and usually do not require co-financing. Under the Common Agricultural Policy 
(heading 1a), a national top-up of direct payments to farmers is possible, though 
not obligatory, because they will be gradually phased in over the next years 
until they reach the current EU level. However, this expenditure can not be 
directly attributed to accession, but is due to the political decision of a New 
Member State. Rural development (heading 1b) and structural actions (heading 
2) as well as pre-accession funds usually require national co-financing, public or 
private, at varying rates. While pre-accession funds also have a requirement of 
project additionality, this is in practice rather theoretical. Only Structural Funds, 
however, have an explicit additionality requirement and should not substitute 
national expenditure which will be further explained below. 
During the 1990s, the importance of Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund 
has increased substantially both as a share of the EU’s budget, which accounts 
now for about one third of the total budget, and relative to the size of some 
Member States’ economies. The biggest beneficiaries in relative terms were the 
Cohesion Countries - Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal - which are eligible to 
the Cohesion Fund to finance projects on environment and transport and where 
large areas are eligible to Objective 1 assistance under the Structural Funds to 
finance programmes for the least developed regions. Figure 4, which presents 
these payments relative to GDP peaking at above 3½% for Portugal in 1993, 
shows that there is a cycle across the programming periods (1989-93, 1994-99, 
2000-06) with payments being rather low at the beginning of the period because 
of “teething problems” whereas payments are fairly high towards the end of the 
period when programmes have achieved “cruising speed”. The drop in 
2000/2001 in Spain and Portugal and in Greece in 2002 should thus not be seen 
as a continuous declining trend and has already seen a reversal for Spain and 
Portugal in 2002. However, in Ireland the decrease of funds could be more 
permanent. 
  10Figure 4: Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund payments in Cohesion 





























Source: own calculations; European Commission for Cohesion Fund and Court of Auditor’s 
Annual Report for Structural Funds 
All the new Member States will be eligible to the Cohesion Fund, while Cyprus 
and the regions of Prague and Bratislava will not be eligible to Objective 1 
assistance but only to assistance under Objectives 2 and 3. In terms of 
commitments, Cohesion Fund spending will be one third of all structural 
spending in the new Member States from 2004 to 2006. The profile of payments 
to the new Member States foreseen under Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
take account of the current Cohesion Countries’ experience with programming 
cycles and are therefore rather low in 2004 and increase stronger in 2005 and 
2006. Even for the largest beneficiary, Latvia, payments are not expected to 
achieve in 2006 the relative size of what Greece, Ireland and Greece had 
received in the mid-1990s when their income relative to the EU average was 
higher that of the new Member States (Figure 5). 
  11Figure 5: EU payments to the new Member States for Structural Funds and 
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Source: own calculations; see Annex for explanations on methodology 
 
In order to increase the incentives for their efficient use, EU structural 
assistance only finances less than the total costs of a programme or project, 
which means that there is a need for national co-financing. Such co-financing 
requirements also exist for the pre-accession funds (PHARE, SAPARD and 
ISPA) and rural development measures (EAGGF Guarantee) with a maximum 
EU contribution of, as a general rule with some exceptions, 75% of total public 
expenditure. Article 29, §3, of the Structural Funds Regulation and Article 7, 
§1, of the Cohesion Fund Regulation stipulate that the EU funds contribute: 
•  a maximum of 75% of the total eligible cost of measures carried out in 
Objective 1 regions which may rise to a maximum of 80% in Cohesion Fund 
countries in exceptional and duly justified cases; 
•  a maximum of 50% of the total eligible cost in Objective 2 and 3 regions; 
•  80% to 85% of public or equivalent expenditure of a Cohesion Fund project. 
In Figure 6, the standard national co-financing rates of 25% for the pre-
accession instruments and rural development measures, 25% for Structural 
Funds (Objective 1) and 20% for the Cohesion Fund have been assumed; these 
rates can be lower in some cases. For Cyprus, Prague, and Bratislava, a 50% co-
financing rate has been assumed for the non-Objective 1 share of Structural 
Funds. This implies two simplifying assumptions which might offset each other 
to some degree: On the one hand, this assumes that the maximum contribution 
of EU funds is used for all measures whereas there might be an interest not do 
so in order to increase the number of EU-financed projects. On the other hand, 
this also assumes that all co-financing involves public expenditure although co-
financing may also come from private sources. On average, the estimate for the 
  12new Member States’ co-financing requirements equal 0.31% of GDP in 2004, 
0.49% in 2005 and 0.55% in 2006. For the largest beneficiary, Latvia, the ratio 
increases from 0.59% in 2004 to 1.16% in 2006.  
Figure 6: Estimated national co-financing of pre-accession instruments, rural 
development programmes, Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund in the new 









CY CZ EE HU PL SI LT LV SK MT AC10
2004 2005 2006
 
Source: own calculations; see Annex for explanations on methodology 
 
There is a widespread confusion in the literature to equate the Structural Funds 
co-financing requirement with the principle of additionality. According to 
Article 11 of the Structural Funds Regulation, “the Funds may not replace 
public or other equivalent structural expenditure by the Member State”. This is 
made operational by determining at the beginning of the programming period 
“the level of public or equivalent structural expenditure that the Member State is 
to maintain in the sum of its regions covered by Objective 1 during the 
programming period” which is verified at the end of 2003 and at the end of 
2005.
4 The concept applied is that the relevant national public expenditure must 
be eligible to financing by Structural Funds and is the sum of, firstly, the 
national public co-financing of EU funded programmes and, secondly, other 
public expenditure on projects which - although in principle eligible – do not 
benefit from a contribution from EU Structural Funds.
5 Hence, the additionality 
requirement only relates to EU funding, not to national co-financing. If a 
Member State managed to shift funds from potentially EU-financed expenditure 
towards actual national public co-financing of EU projects, this is in compliance 
with the principle of additionality and does not imply any additional national 
                                                 
4 For Objectives 2 and 3, the relevant variable is expenditure on active labour market policy at 
national level. 
5 Cf. European Commission 1999. 
  13expenditure. However, this requires some restructuring of budgets which – in 
particular in more decentralised fiscal systems and young democracies with a 
fragmented political landscape – may indeed face political and technical 
restrictions to reallocate between ministries and budgetary authorities which can 
after all give rise to additional national expenditure. In view of gross fixed 
capital formation of general government of close to 3% of GDP or above in all 
new Member States in 2001/2002 (according to Eurostat figures) and the 
substantial overlap with projects eligible to Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
(the main exception being spending on human resources), there might not even 
be the need for a substantial restructuring of the national budget. 
4.  Other fiscal effects from accession 
Candidate Countries have presented their own estimates on the fiscal “cost” of 
accession in the pre-accession period (see Table 3). However, these estimates 
might be upward-biased for at least three reasons (cf. Funck 2003): First, the 
expenditure estimates may not always reflect the available least cost options. 
Second, the extent to which those “accession-related” expenditures indeed 
represent additional expenditures or would have taken place irrespective of 
accession is a matter of debate. Thirdly, there is a possibility that some of the 
underlying estimates have been inflated to support the cases of a larger state 
budget or of more EU funds. 
Table 3: Fiscal cost of EU accession and sources of financing: national 
estimates, annual average in % of GDP 














1  7.6 3.6  3.3  0.3  2.2  1.9  2000-06 
Czech Republic  3.2 2.4  1.1  1.2  0.3  0.5  2001-02 
Hungary  2.1 1.2  1.2  0.0  0.5  0.4  2000-02 
Latvia  3.3 1.6  1.4  0.2  1.1  0.6  2002-02 
Lithuania  1.7 1.0  0.6  0.4  0.4  0.2  2001-09 
Poland  1.0 0.4  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.0  2000-03 
Romania  3.8 1.2  1.2  0.0  0.9  1.6  2001-04 
Slovak Republic  3.6 1.3  1.3  0.0  0.9  1.4  2000-02 
Slovenia  2.6 2.2  2.2  0.0  0.4  0.0  1999-03 
1/ Excluding private sources. 
Source:  Funck 2003 based on CEECs’ National Program for Adopting the Acquis and 2000 
GDP to calculate financial needs for EU accession in terms of GDP. 
 
Among the many possible fiscal effects (see Kopits/Székely 2002 and Backé 
2002), four seem to be potentially more serious: 
•  The pre-financing of direct payments to farmers, in the context of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which are only reimbursed from the 
EU budget in the subsequent year. 
  14•  The implementation of the acquis communautaire, in particular in the areas 
of EU environmental policies and social policies as well as the 
harmonisation of technical standards; 
•  The building-up of administrative capacity to implement EU policies and to 
effectively participate in the EU decision-making bodies;  
•  The alignment of excise tax rates, VAT collection and custom tariffs. 
The pre-financing of direct payments to farmers with reimbursement only in the 
subsequent year will have two ways of affecting the new Member States’ 
budgets. First, payments in 2004 will have to be fully pre-financed. Second, the 
phasing-in of direct payments in the new Member States over 10 years starting 
at 25% of the amounts paid in the EU-15 Member States in 2004 and rising by 
five percentage points per year implies that for a given year the reimbursements 
are likely to be short of actual payments in this transitory phase. Based on the 
2005 figure from the Copenhagen table, the new Member States will have to 
advance 0.27% of GDP in 2004, the highest figures being 0.40% for Lithuania, 
0.35% for Hungary and 0.31% for Poland. Assuming the difference between EU 
payments in 2006 and 2005 as the required national pre-financing in 2005 and 
the difference between 2007 (assumed to be the 40/35
th or 8/7
th of the 2006 
figure) and 2006 as the required pre-financing in 2006, these amounts decrease 
to average 0.05% and 0.04% of GDP respectively with little variation across 
countries. Hence, there can only be a sizeable effect in 2004 and only for those 
countries where no similar support scheme existed before so that expenditure 
would be truly additional. 
In principle, the national implementation of the acquis communautaire should 
already have been in place or entered into force at the time of accession. 
However, there are areas where transition periods have been agreed in the 
negotiations (e.g. environmental policies). In most of these cases, the largest 
part of the costs will fall on the private sector and should not trigger substantial 
public expenditure. The major exception is environmental policies, in particular 
the rehabilitation of polluted industrial sites, water treatment and waste 
management, which usually require considerable public investment. However, 
these areas are eligible to financing from Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
and therefore do not necessarily require substantial national public funding. 
The implementation of EU policies and the participation in the EU decision-
making bodies require a non-negligible administrative capacity. A major part of 
this capacity has already been built up before accession, also in the context of 
pre-accession assistance which has institution-building as one of its main 
objectives and also attempts to build up structures necessary for the 
management of Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund. Furthermore, the new 
Member States already started to participate in the meetings of EU decision-
making bodies on an observatory basis after the signing of the Accession 
Treaty. Finally, heading 3 of the Copenhagen package includes transitory 
funding for institution-building and for preparations to participate in the 
Schengen agreement. 
  15Indirect taxes are usually considerably lower in the new Member States than 
required by EU legislation, in particular regarding excise tax rates on fuel, 
alcohol and tobacco as well as the applied VAT rates. In view of the social 
implications of sudden strong increases in these rates, all the new Member 
States have negotiated transition periods mostly until the end of 2007. Gradual 
adjustment to higher rates should increase budget revenues already before the 
end of the transition periods unless consumers react with strong substitution to 
avoid taxes. On the other hand, adapting the VAT collection system to the EU 
system, which does not rely on border controls, could imply lower revenues 
where VAT collection was fairly efficient before accession.
6 Furthermore, 
custom tariffs will often need a downward adjustment to the Common External 
Tariff of the EU. After accession, 75% of the custom revenues go directly to the 
EU budget while Member States keep 25% to cover collection costs. However, 
given the already low tariff rates for most industrial goods in the new Member 
States before accession, custom revenues are no longer an important part of total 
revenues. Accession should thus not have significant effects on this revenue 
item. 
5. Conclusions 
Looking at the balance of fiscal effects of accession from the new Member 
States’ budget point of view, it would be difficult to argue that accession will 
substantially increase fiscal pressure in the new Member States. In Figure 7 the 
Structural Funds (because of the additionality requirement) were subtracted 
from the net payments received by the new Member States. On average, this 
balance is close to 0.5% of GDP in 2004 and exceeds 1% of GDP in 2006; in 
Latvia it could reach 2.5% of GDP in 2006. In conformity with the principle of 
additionality for the Structural Funds, the national co-financing is not 
necessarily additional spending but could come from already existing budget 
lines for similar spending purposes. Even if co-financing were additional, the 
overall balance would turn only marginally negative for some of the countries. 
The pre-financing of direct payments to farmers, the implementation of the 
acquis communautaire, the building-up of the administrative capacity and the 
net effects of the alignment of indirect tax rates and custom tariffs are unlikely 
to have dimensions which could offset the positive net payments from the EU 
budget.  
                                                 
6 See Mrak (2003) pointing to this problem for the case of Slovenia. 
  16Figure 7: Estimated net payments from the EU budget to the new Member 
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Source: own calculations; see Annex for explanations on methodology 
 
On balance, and in contrast to what the literature often concludes, accession 
should rather reduce the fiscal strains in the new Member States. No doubt, 
changes in the new Member States’ budgets will be necessary and the transition 
year 2004 could be particularly difficult in that budgetary and administrative 
procedures have to be adapted in order to actually absorb the payments as 
projected by the Copenhagen package. However, this should not be a 
fundamental problem unless there are built-in inflexibilities in the budget, 
possibly arising from a weak political system, different fiscal layers or a strong 
fiscal autonomy of sectoral ministries. Even in this case, there is no need to 
have a higher deficit or to decrease capital expenditure, given the potential for 
cuts in current expenditure which are however politically more difficult to 
decide. Accession should thus be seen as an opportunity to further enhance the 
efficiency of public spending in the new Member States. Furthermore, given 
their focus on improving conditions for private investment, EU expenditure can 
be expected to have a wider positive economic impact. Therefore, accession 
itself is not a very convincing justification for higher budget deficits in the new 
Member States after accession.  
  17Annex 
METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO CALCULATE EU BUDGET PAYMENTS TO THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES 
 
EU budget figures used here have been taken from European Commission 
(2003a) which gives the indicative allocation in the financial framework for 
enlargement 2004 to 2006 (the so-called “Copenhagen Package” which allowed 
to conclude accession negotiations with the 10 new Member States in December 
2002). Figures there are presented as commitment and payment appropriations, 
in million € in 1999 prices by each year and country.  
Commitments and payments:
7  While from a budget planning point of view 
appropriations for commitments are the most important budget figures, actual 
payments are more relevant from the economic point of view of beneficiaries. 
Table A.1 gives the total indicative payments for the years 2004 to 2006. 
Compared to the original source, there are some minor rounding errors. 
From 1999 prices to current prices: As indicated in the EU Budget 2004, a 2% 
deflator is used for headings 1 and 2 and the GNI deflator for the other 
headings. The respective values given there are 10.41% and 10.72624% for the 
period until 2004. For the years 2005 and 2006 a GNI deflator of 2% has been 
assumed here. 
EU pre-accession aid: The EU Budget 2004 gives expected payments data for 
pre-accession aid (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD) in the years 2004 to 2006 for 
Malta and Cyprus together and for the other eight new Member States together. 
Payments for each individual country have been estimated here on the basis of 
the share in January 2003 population in the respective country group. 
GDP 2004 to 2006: GDP figures in € in current prices have been taken from the 
European Commission’s forecasts published in spring 2004 (available in the 
AMECO database on DG ECFIN’s website). Since the last year included in the 
forecasts is 2005, the nominal GDP growth rate of 2005 has been used to project 
GDP in 2006. Projections for GNI per capita in PPS apply the real GDP growth 
rates of the Commission forecast (and the 2005 growth rate to calculate the 
figure for 2006), thus assuming the absence of changes in population and 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). 
Net payments from the EU budget (Figure 2): New Member States’ 
contributions to the EU budget in 2004 have been taken from the EU Budget 
2004 (European Commission 2004). For the years 2005 and 2006, the 
contributions to the EU budget relative to GDP have been assumed to be 50% 
higher than in 2004. The latter takes into account that the new Member States 
only participate in two thirds of the budget year 2004 also with their 
                                                 
7 Commitment appropriations make it possible to enter into legal obligations during the financial 
year for activities whose implementation extends over several financial years. Payment 
appropriations make it possible to cover expenditure arising from commitments entered into 
legal obligations during current and preceding financial years. 
  18contributions. Relating it to GDP takes the possible effects of nominal GDP 
growth into account.  
Operational budget balance of the new Member States in 2006 (Figure 3): The 
methodology applied by the European Commission (1998, Annex 3, and 2003c, 
p.125) has been used as far as possible. Main methodological elements are 
excluding traditional own resources and administrative expenditure as well as 
taking into account the UK rebate. However, it was not possible to make the 
same adjustments as in European Commission (2003d) in order to make the 
balances sum up to zero since this would require knowing current Member 
States budget balance in 2006. The results are thus not fully comparable 
between old and new Member States not only because of different years (2002 
and 2006) but also because of slightly different methodologies. Gross National 
Income (GNI) for 2006 has been calculated in the same way as GDP, i.e. by 
using the 2005 nominal GDP growth rate (see above). 
The co-financing of EU structural assistance (Figure 6): The standard co-
financing rates of 25% for pre-accession instruments, rural development 
measures (EAGGF Guarantee) and the Structural Funds (Objective 1) as well as 
20% for the Cohesion Fund have been assumed. For Cyprus, Prague and 
Bratislava, which are not eligible to Objective 1 funding, a 50% co-financing 
rate has been used for the non-Objective 1 share of Structural Funds as indicated 
in European Commission (2003b), Annex, Table 11.  
  19Table A.1: Financial framework for enlargement 2004-2006 (Copenhagen package) - Indicative allocation of payment appropriations in 
million € 1999 prices 
CY CZ EE HU PL SI LT LV SK MT
not allo-
cated Total
Heading 1 - Agriculture 94.9 975.1 213.8 1,321.9 3,871.2 326.2 594.1 313.8 521.6 21.2 0.0 8,253.8
Of which:
1a - Common Agricultural Policy 48.7 638.4 120.4 948.3 2,093.4 151.7 290.6 110.3 275.4 4.5 0.0 4,681.7
1b - Rural development 46.2 336.7 93.4 373.6 1,777.8 174.5 303.5 203.5 246.2 16.7 0.0 3,572.1
Heading 2 - Structural actions after capping 37.7 950.4 237.0 1,170.9 4,742.5 159.1 544.9 406.1 651.4 34.6 19.6 8,954.2
Of which:
Structural Funds 26.8 760.2 174.2 944.9 3,893.5 120.7 419.3 292.7 535.5 30.2 19.6 7,217.6
Cohesion Fund 10.9 190.2 62.8 226.0 849.0 38.4 125.6 113.4 115.9 4.4 0.0 1,736.6
Heading 3 - Internal Policies 28.0 247.0 103.9 391.5 1,190.7 175.0 374.0 133.3 221.1 11.8 0.0 2,876.3
Of which:
Existing policies 26.3 222.1 26.1 211.6 779.3 61.2 53.6 48.7 97.1 11.2 0.0 1,537.2
Nuclear safety 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 167.4 0.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 227.9
Institution building 1.2 24.9 9.1 32.0 131.5 7.0 17.2 13.5 16.3 0.6 0.0 253.3
Schengen 0.0 0.0 68.7 147.9 279.9 106.8 135.8 71.1 47.7 0.0 0.0 857.9
Heading 5 - Administration 1,673.0
Budgetary compensations 338.3 746.4 21.6 211.3 1,442.8 232.6 47.4 26.3 86.0 232.9 0.0 3,385.6
Total 498.9 2,918.9 576.3 3,095.6 11,247.2 892.9 1,560.4 879.5 1,480.1 300.5 19.6 25,142.9  





Table A.2: Estimates of contributions to and payments from the EU budget in % of projected GDP, 2004-2006 
 
CY CZ EE HU PL SI LT LV SK MT average
2004 0.75 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.82 0.73
2005 1.12 0.99 1.06 1.10 1.11 1.14 1.10 1.09 1.13 1.23 1.09
2006 1.12 0.99 1.06 1.10 1.11 1.14 1.10 1.09 1.13 1.23 1.09
2004 1.22 1.12 1.95 1.16 1.72 1.13 2.37 2.56 1.35 1.78 1.60
2005 1.70 1.74 3.03 1.86 2.97 1.61 3.97 4.16 2.23 3.11 2.58
2006 1.69 1.82 3.35 2.04 3.25 1.69 4.31 4.82 2.53 3.14 2.80
2004 0.48 0.46 1.25 0.43 0.98 0.37 1.64 1.84 0.60 0.96 0.87
2005 0.58 0.75 1.97 0.76 1.86 0.47 2.87 3.07 1.10 1.89 1.49
2006 0.57 0.82 2.29 0.93 2.14 0.55 3.21 3.73 1.40 1.92 1.71
2004 0.11 0.22 0.37 0.23 0.40 0.14 0.46 0.59 0.34 0.13 0.31
2005 0.16 0.33 0.61 0.35 0.61 0.23 0.75 0.99 0.55 0.19 0.49
2006 0.19 0.37 0.70 0.39 0.69 0.28 0.86 1.16 0.62 0.21 0.55
2004 0.05 0.22 0.51 0.29 0.51 0.11 0.58 0.75 0.40 0.17 0.38
2005 0.09 0.38 0.84 0.49 0.86 0.20 0.96 1.25 0.68 0.30 0.65
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